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Raich v. Ashcroft: Medical Marijuana
and the Revival of Federalism
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism
are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories
for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best
solution is far from clear.”1
Angel Raich suffers from an inoperable brain tumor, seizures, lifethreatening weight loss, and chronic pain. Without proper treatment she
will die. Diane Monson suffers from a degenerative spinal disease that
causes severe chronic pain and muscle spasms. Both women have tried
essentially all methods of treatment, and both suffered greatly, while
1.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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nothing relieved their pain.2 Luckily, the women and tens of thousands
of others like them live in California,3 and their fellow Californians
legalized a solution in 1996: marijuana.4 Faced with the possibility
that only marijuana could provide relief for a variety of serious
illnesses, the people of California enacted the Compassionate Use Act of
1996 (Compassionate Use Act), which recognizes a right to obtain
marijuana for medical treatment.5
Since 1996, nine states have passed legislation that flies directly in the
face of the federal government’s “war on drugs,” as embodied in the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).6 The CSA ranks marijuana as
one of the most noxious controlled substances, placing it in the same
category as substances such as heroin.7 However, voters in Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington have authorized doctors to recommend, and patients to
possess and use marijuana for the treatment of many debilitating
illnesses.8 Despite the clear will of the voters in these states, the federal
2. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920–21 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Raich I),
rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004). According
to the district court, “[t]raditional medicine has utterly failed these women; none of the
treatments, prescription medications, or other interventions attempted by them and their
physicians has proven effective. . . . The only thing that has provided any relief from
symptoms and/or improvement in their condition is medication with cannabis.” Id. at
921 (citations omitted).
3. While statistics on the subject are unreliable, the Los Angeles Times reports
that medical marijuana opponents and proponents agree that there are tens of thousands
of people in California alone using marijuana on the recommendation of their physician.
Henry Weinstein, Medical Pot Users Win Key Ruling: The U.S. Can’t Prosecute Patients
Who Use It on the Advice of a Physician and Obtain the Drug at No Charge, an Appeals
Court Panel Rules, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A1.
4. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.5–
.795 (West Supp. 2004). Proponents and opponents of medical marijuana debate the
effectiveness of the substance as medicine. See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR REFORM OF MARIJUANA
LAWS, EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MARIJUANA’S MEDICAL VALUE, at http://www.norml.
org/index.cfm?Group_ID=5441 (2004) (discussing the medical uses of marijuana); OFF.
OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT AMERICANS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MARIJUANA,
at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/amer_know_marij (last updated
Feb. 5, 2003) (discussing the risks associated with marijuana use, and maintaining that
there is no established medical use for the drug); see also Deborah Garner, Note, Up in
Smoke: The Medicinal Marijuana Debate, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 555, 574–78 (1999) (discussing
the various positions in the debate over effectiveness).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5.
6. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000); see also OFF. OF NAT’L
DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, THE PRESIDENT’S NAT’L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2004, at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs04/index.html (last
updated Mar. 29, 2004) (discussing the current plans for the war on drugs); infra note 8
and accompanying text (enumerating the states that have passed legislation conflicting
with the federal Controlled Substances Act).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Schedule I) (2000); see infra Part II.B.
8. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010–.080 (Michie Supp. 2003); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
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government has continued to enforce the CSA against users and
distributors of medical marijuana.9
Most recently, the federal government raided the home of Diane
Monson in Northern California.10 After California officials refused to act,
determining that her conduct was lawful under California law, federal
DEA agents entered her home and seized and destroyed her marijuana
plants.11 Diane Monson and Angel Raich, who feared a similar raid,
sued. In Raich v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the CSA was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce power when
applied to citizens who use marijuana that has not traveled interstate and
11362.5–.795; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to -128
(Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383B(5) (West 2004); NEV. CONST. art.
IV, § 38; OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005 (West
Supp. 2004). Voters in the District of Columbia also overwhelmingly approved a
measure that would legalize medical marijuana. However, even with sixty-nine percent
approval, the measure did not become law due to a prohibition on spending any money
on the ballot measure. The prohibition had been passed as part of an appropriations bill.
Apparently, only $1.64 was needed in order to pay an employee of the Board of
Elections to verify the results with a computer. A judge later ordered the results
released. Alistair E. Newbern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of
State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1575, 1578–79 (2000).
9. The federal government has attempted to enforce the CSA on many fronts by
taking action against dispensaries, users, and doctors. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (granting motion for permanent injunction
against dispenser of medical marijuana under California’s Compassionate Use Act);
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (Raich II) (granting injunction barring
the enforcement of CSA against individual medical marijuana users), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 2909 (2004); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding
injunction barring the enforcement of government policy to punish physicians who
prescribe medical marijuana), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003); County of Santa Cruz
v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195–97 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (denying motion to enjoin
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) requiring the government to return confiscated
marijuana plants to dispensary after their raid on cooperative). In one telling example,
federal DEA agents raided a Santa Cruz cooperative that was providing marijuana within
the Compassionate Use Act to severely ill people, most of whom were terminally ill.
County of Santa Cruz, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1195–97. In September 2002, between twenty
and thirty agents forcibly entered the building, forced the operators to the ground, and
attempted to arrest several members of the cooperative that were present. Id. at 1197.
One member, while several assault rifles were pointed at her, had to explain to the agents
that she was unable to put her hands on her head because she was paralyzed. Joel Stein
et al., The New Politics of Pot: Can It Go Legit? How the People Who Brought You
Medical Marijuana Have Set Their Sights on Lifting the Ban For Everyone, TIME, Nov.
4, 2002, at 56, 59–60 (describing the debate over legalization).
10. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
11. Id.
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was never intended for interstate or foreign commerce.12
In ruling against the extension of Congress’s commerce power in
Raich, the Ninth Circuit continued a line of recent cases in which it ruled
to limit the reach of Congress.13 This Casenote argues that Raich was
correctly decided and should be upheld by the Supreme Court on
appeal.14 In addition, the judiciary should continue to narrowly interpret
the commerce power in order to further the fundamental purpose of our
dual system of government: protection of individual rights. More specifically,
courts should apply the reasoning of Raich and narrowly define the
classes of activities involved in Commerce Clause challenges.
Part II of this Casenote provides an overview of the history and
current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as well as an analysis
of the effectiveness of that jurisprudence and the various ways in which
lower courts can apply it. Part III reviews the Raich case and the applicable
marijuana legislation. Part IV analyzes the Raich decision and the other
recent Ninth Circuit decisions in light of the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause framework. Finally, Part VI recommends that the Supreme Court
affirm Raich, and that the federal courts apply the reasoning of Raich to
other Commerce Clause challenges and narrowly define the class of
activity involved in an “as applied” Commerce Clause challenge to a
federal statute. A narrow definition is mandated by the Supreme Court
and is necessary to protect both individual liberty and the dual system of
government intended by the Framers.
II. THE MARIJUANA DEBATE
The battle lines in the struggle to delineate the proper scope of federal
power are clearly drawn in the medical marijuana debate.15 California’s
12. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1234–35.
13. See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a
federal statute prohibiting possession of child pornography to be an unconstitutional
exercise of commerce power as applied to a woman in possession of a photograph with
no intent to distribute, exchange, or otherwise use for commercial purposes); United
States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a federal statute
prohibiting possession of machine guns was an unconstitutional exercise of commerce
power as applied to a person in possession of unlawful machine guns and rifle kits when
only unusable parts had traveled in interstate commerce).
14. The government’s petition for certiorari was granted on June 28, 2004. Ashcroft v.
Raich, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
15. While it is outside the scope of this Casenote, it is interesting to note that while
limiting federal power has historically been a Republican or conservative goal, the
medical marijuana issue highlights the fact that a promotion of individual rights may, in
fact, allow behavior that many conservatives find immoral or reprehensible. On the
other hand, the traditional liberal position in support of an expansive federal government
leads to encroachment on individual liberties such as the use of medical marijuana.
Thus, issues such as medical marijuana cause both groups to face the potential
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Compassionate Use Act16 and the other state laws legalizing medicinal
use of marijuana17 are in direct conflict with the federal CSA.18
California’s law has become the focal point of this battle, and its
effectiveness was at issue in Raich.19
A. The Compassionate Use Act
California voters enacted the Compassionate Use Act by direct
initiative in order to ensure that seriously ill individuals have the right to
use and possess marijuana for relief of symptoms from cancer, AIDS,
arthritis, migraine, and other ailments, as long as such use is recommended
by a doctor.20
discrepancies in their respective ideologies. For an interesting discussion of these issues
see Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1541 (2002).
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.5–.795 (West Supp. 2004).
17. See supra note 8 (listing the state laws currently in force).
18. See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the CSA reaches the uses of marijuana that are legal under
the Compassionate Use Act because the Compassionate Use Act directly conflicts with
the CSA). Because of this conflict, the Compassionate Use Act is preempted by the
CSA. See infra note 43. At least one commentator has argued that the Compassionate
Use Act does not, in fact, conflict with the CSA, but rather creates an exception to that
law. James D. Abrams, Note, A Missed Opportunity: Medical Use of Marijuana is
Legally Defensible, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 883, 910–11 (2003). However, it is unclear how
one can logically argue that a state statute that legalizes marijuana in some instances is
not directly contrary to a federal statute that makes that same substance illegal in all
instances. For purposes of this Casenote, I assume that the laws are in conflict, and that
the federal CSA, therefore, preempts California’s Compassionate Use Act. See infra
note 43. Preemption is outside of the scope of this Casenote, as Raich v. Ashcroft
involves the constitutionality of the federal law. See infra Parts III and V.
19. Had the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exertion of federal power in Raich, the
Compassionate Use Act would only protect Californians against prosecution by state
authorities. See infra Part II.A. Due to the ambitions of federal authorities, see THE
PRESIDENT’S NAT’L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2004, supra note 6, this protection alone
means very little to an ill person seeking relief without prosecution.
20. The stated purposes of the statute are:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate
and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the
person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of
cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine,
or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are
not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to

1877

EVERETT.DOC

8/21/2019 3:56 PM

Although California law prohibits possession or cultivation of marijuana,21
the Compassionate Use Act creates an exemption for patients (and their
primary caregivers)22 whose doctor has recommended marijuana for
medical purposes.23 It also provides protection for physicians who prescribe
or recommend marijuana for medical purposes.24
California’s Compassionate Use Act has no bearing on federal law,25
and, as the Raich plaintiffs became aware, those who use and possess
marijuana for any purpose risk prosecution by federal authorities under
the federal CSA.26

provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in
medical need of marijuana.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A)–(C).
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11357–11362 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
22. “Primary caregiver” is defined as the person who has consistently assumed
responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of the patient. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11362.7(d). To be protected, the primary caregiver must be at least eighteen
years old and within one of the three statutory categories. Id. § 11362.7(d)(1)–(3), (e).
23. Id. § 11362.71(e) (“No person or designated primary caregiver in possession of
a valid identification card shall be subject to arrest for possession, transportation,
delivery, or cultivation of medical marijuana in an amount established pursuant to this
article . . . .”). California’s State Department of Health Services is charged with
establishing and maintaining a program under which it issues identification cards to
qualified individuals. Id. § 11362.71(a). In addition, each county health department
must take part in the administration of the identification card program. Id. §
11362.71(b). The identification card system is voluntary; to realize protection under the
Compassionate Use Act, a person in possession of marijuana need only show authorities
that his or her physician recommended the use of marijuana for treatment. S.B. 420,
2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). The identification card system serves to alleviate
confusion, unnecessary expenditure of resources, and inconvenience. In the absence of
an identification card, the police are not required to abandon a search when presented
with evidence of a physician recommendation. People v. Fisher, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838,
840 (Ct. App. 2002). If the person in possession is apprehended, the burden of proving
the presence of a physician’s recommendation at hearing or trial is on the defendant.
People v. Jones, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 916, 921–22 (Ct. App. 2003).
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c) (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or
privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.”). The
Compassionate Use Act does not preempt federal law in this area. See infra note 43.
However, in Conant v. Walters, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the federal government from
revoking physician licenses or investigating California physicians because such
investigation and/or revocation of licenses was unconstitutional because it violated the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech. 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
25. See infra note 43. This has caused much confusion on the part of state and
local law enforcement agencies. See Jeff McDonald, Disparity Clouding Medical Pot
Law: Enforcement of ‘96 State Measure Differs Widely, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb.
22, 2004, at B2, B4.
26. Under the current administration, the federal government has intensified efforts
to stop marijuana use for medicinal purposes. See Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of
Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787,
1788–800 (2003).
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B. The Federal Controlled Substances Act
Under the CSA, it is illegal to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance,” unless the CSA itself provides otherwise.27 It is also a crime
to possess controlled substances, unless it is within an exception under
the CSA.28
The CSA is one title of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, passed in 1970, for the stated purposes of (1) preventing
drug abuse and rehabilitating users, (2) providing more effective means
of law enforcement, and (3) providing for an “overall balanced scheme”
of criminal penalties for drug offenses.29 Title II, the CSA, lays out the
congressional findings that justify the law, including several that bear
directly on congressional commerce power.30 These include findings
that most drug traffic flows through interstate and foreign commerce,
that local distribution and possession contributes to the interstate traffic,
and that federal control of intrastate traffic is necessary to the control of
interstate traffic.31
27. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
28. Id. § 844(a). The CSA allows possession, with a prescription, of substances in
all schedules other than Schedule I. See id. § 829. For example, a doctor may prescribe
substances listed in Schedule II with the appropriate license. See Conant, 309 F.3d at
640 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (describing the impact of federal revocation of a
doctor’s Schedule II license).
29. COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COMPREHENSIVE DRUG
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 91–1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567.
30. See infra Part IV.A.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 801. The relevant part of the statute provides:
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through
interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect
upon interstate commerce because—
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in
interstate commerce,
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been
transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution,
and
(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate
commerce immediately prior to such possession.
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate.
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The CSA classifies controlled substances into five schedules, with
marijuana appearing in the most restrictive Schedule I.32 Substances are
placed in Schedule I if they have a high potential for abuse, no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and “[t]here is a
lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision.”33
Despite the legalization of medicinal marijuana in Canada34 and
provision of medical marijuana to a select few by the United States
government,35 the federal government has been steadfastly resistant to
the reclassification of marijuana into Schedule II. 36 Placing marijuana
into Schedule II would make the drug available with a prescription.37
This resistance continues to this day,38 notwithstanding findings by both
the United States government39 and the British House of Lords40

Id.

Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled
substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances
manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such
traffic.

32. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Schedule I). The Attorney General and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services have the power to add or remove substances from the
Schedules. Id. § 811.
33. Id. § 812(b)(1)(C). Other Schedule I substances include ketobemidone,
diethylthiambutene, and heroin. Id. § 812(c) (Schedule I).
34. Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001–227, available at http://www.
canlii.org/ca/regu/sor1-227/sec1%2Ehtml (regulations allowing cultivation and possession of
marijuana for medicinal use); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 642 (9th Cir.
2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
35. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 648. The government continues to supply marijuana
to individuals who participated in the federal medical marijuana program that existed
from 1978 to 1992. Id.
36. See Garner, supra note 4, at 574–78.
37. Schedule II substances, which are considered to be highly addictive yet have
an accepted medical use, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(2)(A)–(B), include morphine, cocaine,
amphetamines, and PCP. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 (2004). Schedule II substances can be
prescribed by doctors in appropriate circumstances. See supra note 28.
38. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (Schedule I). The federal government has not admitted
that there may be any medical use for the drug. According to Andrea Barthwell, Deputy
Director of the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy, “[t]here is no
scientific evidence that qualifies smoked marijuana to be called medicine.” Steve
Chapman, Medical Marijuana Movement Still Stonewalled by Enemies, BALTIMORE SUN,
Mar. 2, 2004, at 13A.
39. INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE
(Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html.
This report by the National Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences,
commissioned by the White House Officer of National Drug Control Policy, found that
“[t]he accumulated data indicate a potential therapeutic value for cannabinoid
drugs . . . .” Id. at 3; see also Conant, 309 F.3d at 641–43 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
40. SELECT COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., HOUSE OF LORDS, NINTH REPORT, Medical
Use of Cannabis: Recommendations 1998, §§ 8.2, 8.3, available at http://www.publications.
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confirming the potential benefits of the drug. Reclassification is not
procedurally problematic, as the CSA provides a procedure for the
reclassification or removal of substances.41
There have been several attempts to get marijuana reclassified, through
both legal and legislative means, but none have been successful.42
Because of these failed attempts, advocates of medical marijuana have
sought to make it available through other means, such as the Compassionate
Use Act. However, state laws legalizing marijuana do not protect
individuals from federal prosecution under the federal law, because the
federal CSA preempts California’s Compassionate Use Act under the
Supremacy Clause.43 Thus, California’s Compassionate Use Act affords
no protection to individuals who are prosecuted by federal authorities for
possession or distribution of marijuana. While those prosecuted have
put forth several theories under which they should be protected, the only
successes have come under the First Amendment,44 and in Raich, under
the Commerce Clause.45
parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/151/15101.htm recommending that the British
government allow doctors to prescribe marijuana); see also Conant, 309 F.3d at 641–43
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 892 F.2d 453, 454–56 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no
violation of due process because the placement of marijuana in Section I was not arbitrary and
capricious); United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547–48 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
marijuana’s placement in Section I is not irrational in light of ongoing dispute as to physical
and psychological effects); Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp.
123, 134–36 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding no violation of equal protection because classification is
rational in light of ongoing debate); see also Klein, supra note 15, at 1562–63 (discussing
unsuccessful legislative efforts to get marijuana reclassified); Garner, supra note 4, at 574–78
(discussing reclassification efforts).
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The CSA includes specific language regarding
congressional intent to preempt state law in case the two conflict, 21 U.S.C. § 903, and they
do conflict. See supra note 18. Therefore, the CSA expressly preempts the Compassionate
Use Act. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (holding that an
express statement of preemption is sufficient for federal law to preempt). According to one
district court, the Compassionate Use Act does not even attempt to preempt the federal CSA,
but rather only exempts the individuals covered by the Compassionate Use Act from
enforcement of California laws. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 531 U.S.
1010 (2000), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
44. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639. In Conant, the federal government promulgated a
policy under which doctors were to be prosecuted for recommending or explaining the
benefits of marijuana to their patients. The Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction issued to
prohibit enforcement of this policy, holding that such enforcement would be an
unreasonable restriction on speech. Id.
45. Raich II, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
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III. THE RAICH DECISION
Two severely ill women, Angel Raich and Diane Monson (plaintiffs)
possessed and used marijuana on the direction of their doctors.46
Monson grew marijuana herself, and two anonymous growers supplied
Raich with marijuana at no cost, as she was unable to provide for
herself.47 The marijuana that both plaintiffs used and possessed was grown
completely in California and was not sold or distributed. Raich’s suppliers
allegedly use only soil, water, nutrients, equipment, and supplies originating
in California.48 In August of 2002, agents of the Butte County Sheriff’s
Department and the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) raided
plaintiff Monson’s home. While the sheriffs refused to seize Monson’s
marijuana plants after they determined that her use was legal under
California’s Compassionate Use Act, the DEA did seize and destroy the
plants as a violation of the federal CSA.49 Neither Raich’s home nor
those of her caretakers were raided, but they feared that a raid was likely
without a court’s intervention.50 Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an
injunction against further enforcement of the CSA and a declaration that
the CSA is unconstitutional as applied to those Californians possessing
and using marijuana for medicinal purposes.51
The Supreme Court struck down the use of the medical necessity defense in United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 498–99 (2001).
Defenses based on the Commerce Clause, the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, and
the protection of freedom of speech under the First Amendment have all been asserted.
See Conant, 309 F.3d 629, 630 (involving a challenge based on First Amendment right
to free speech); Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227 (involving a challenge based on the
Commerce Clause, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and a medical necessity defense);
County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201, 1205, 1209 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (involving a challenge based on Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment rights and the
Commerce Clause).
46. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1225. See discussion of the plaintiffs’ medical conditions
supra Part I.
47. Raich’s suppliers sued anonymously in order to maintain her supply during the
litigation. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1225.
48. Id. Although Monson did not testify as to the source of her seeds, the court
stated: “the origin of the seeds is too attenuated an issue to form the basis of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 1233 n.8.
49. Id. at 1225–26. The two agencies were engaged in a “three-hour standoff” before
the DEA finally seized Monson’s plants, which included intervention on behalf of the
Sheriff’s Department by both the District Attorney and the United States Attorney. Raich I,
248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004). See discussion of California’s Compassionate Use Act and
the federal CSA supra Part II.B. California and federal law exist concurrently, and officials
under each law act according to their respective mandate. However, the federal government
cannot force state authorities to enforce the federal law. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149 (1992). Rather, the issue is whether federal authorities can constitutionally enforce
federal law against the users of medicinal marijuana.
50. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
51. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1226. The plaintiffs claimed that the CSA was

1882

EVERETT.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1873, 2004]

8/21/2019 3:56 PM

Raich v. Ashcroft
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The District Court for the Northern District of California denied
plaintiffs’ motions.52 That court, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent,
determined that the plaintiffs had no likelihood of success on the merits
of their claim because the Ninth Circuit had consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the CSA.53 The district court disregarded the fact
that none of the previous Ninth Circuit cases involved medical use of
marijuana.54 The court also did not recognize any intervening Supreme
Court decision that undermined existing precedent, as required for a
district court to overrule Ninth Circuit precedent.55 However, while the
district court could not issue an injunction once it concluded that the
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, it did
find that the public interest in the injunction,56 the likelihood of harm,
unconstitutional as applied to them under the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment,
and the Ninth Amendment. They also claimed that their possession and use should be
exempted from the CSA based on a medical necessity defense. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d
at 922–30. The district court found no likelihood of success on any of these claims. Id.
at 930. The court of appeals considered only the Commerce Clause challenge, and, as
such, the other constitutional and CSA claims are outside of the scope of this Casenote.
However, it should be noted that the medical necessity defense may, in fact, be available
to individuals who are in possession of marijuana for medical purposes. In United States
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that
the defense would not be available to one in possession. 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001).
However, the three concurring Justices noted that the holding of the case was narrow and
did not reach the issue of whether “the defense might be available to a seriously ill
patient for whom there is no alternative means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary
suffering . . . .” Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
52. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
53. Id. at 923–25. The court relied on a series of cases in which the Ninth Circuit
upheld the CSA. See United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the CSA is constitutional after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez); United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the CSA is
constitutional as applied to possession of marijuana plants with intent to distribute);
United States v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding
congressional findings in CSA regarding negative effects of marijuana controlling, and
holding that it is a “matter . . . whose ultimate resolution lies in the legislature”).
54. The court of appeals found this fact compelling. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227
(“[W]e have upheld the CSA in the face of past Commerce Clause challenges. . . . But
none of the cases in which the Ninth Circuit has upheld the CSA on Commerce Clause
grounds involved the use, possession, or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes.”
(internal citations omitted)).
55. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 925. The court dismissed United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), as insufficient to undermine Ninth Circuit precedent. Id.
at 925–26; see discussion of Morrison infra, Part IV.A.
56. Public interest is relevant to a court’s determination of whether a preliminary
injunction should issue in the Ninth Circuit. A court can apply one of two standards: a
traditional test or an alternative test. The traditional test requires that the movant prove
the following: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the movant will
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and the balance of hardships related to the injunction all weighed heavily
in favor of the injunction.57
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded
the case for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.58 The court
distinguished the former Ninth Circuit cases upholding the constitutionality
of the CSA that the district court relied upon,59 as “none of the cases in
which [we have] upheld the CSA on Commerce Clause grounds
involved the use, possession, or cultivation of marijuana for medical
purposes.”60 Reasoning that the activity involved in the case was a
separate and distinct class of activities from those activities involved in
the past cases, the court found itself free to consider the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims.61
Upon application of the appropriate test,62 the court found that the
plaintiffs had, in fact, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits
of their claim.63 The court also agreed with the district court that the
public interest and hardship factors pointed strongly in favor of the
plaintiffs, and, therefore, decided that a preliminary injunction should
issue.64 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the CSA, as applied to those
cultivating or possessing marijuana for medical purposes, is likely an
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s commerce power.65 To understand
why, a brief overview of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is helpful.

suffer irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of hardship favors the applicant; and (4) that
the public interest favors the injunction. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227 (citing Dollar Rent A
Car, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985)). The alternate
test requires that the movant prove either: (1) probable success on the merits and
possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions are raised and that the
balance of hardships tips in his favor. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227 (citing First Brands
Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987)).
57. The interest of the people of California in allowing ill people to possess and
use marijuana is clear, as expressed in the Compassionate Use Act. The court also found
that the plaintiffs would suffer severe harm if the CSA were enforced against them.
Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 930. On the other hand, the federal government’s interests in
the presumption of constitutionality of statutes and the FDA drug approval process
“wane in comparison with the public interests enumerated by plaintiffs and by the harm
that they would suffer if denied medical marijuana.” Id. at 931.
58. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1235. See supra Part V for a detailed analysis of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.
59. See supra note 9 (citing cases).
60. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227.
61. Id. at 1228–29. See discussion of Morrison infra Part IV.A.
62. See infra Part V (analyzing the Raich decision).
63. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1234.
64. Id. at 1235.
65. Id. at 1234.
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCE POWER
The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States . . . .”66 The Supreme Court initially interpreted this seemingly
broad mandate strictly.67 Later, however, expansive interpretations led
to extensive federal regulation of many aspects of modern life. This
regulation extended to those areas that have been traditionally considered
the province of state governments, such as criminal law.68 Indeed,
congressional regulation of controlled substances is carried out under the
commerce power.69 Since 1995, however, the Supreme Court has declined
to further expand the commerce power, refusing to allow congressional
ambitions to go completely unchecked. This section of the Casenote
discusses the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the Supreme
Court and recent Ninth Circuit cases that laid the groundwork for Raich.
A. Supreme Court Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The interpretation of the commerce power began with Gibbons v.
Ogden, in which Chief Justice Marshall articulated a broad power to
regulate all commercial “intercourse” between states that “is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”70 Despite this
broad language, prior to 1937, the Supreme Court consistently put
Congress in check, as it attempted to expand its influence on the states.
The Court invalidated regulations seeking to regulate what it considered
to be local activity,71 while allowing regulation in the instances where
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. See infra Part IV.A.
68. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (involving the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, making it a federal crime to possess a firearm in the vicinity
of a school).
69. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
70. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (finding that the state could not grant an
exclusive license to operate interstate ferry where the federal government also granted
licenses).
71. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (finding that
the regulation of a monopoly in sugar refining was not within the commerce power, as
manufacture of goods was not interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 275–76 (1918) (finding that Congress had no power to regulate the use of child
labor in the manufacture of goods because manufacturing was considered local activity),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (finding that Congress had no power to
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goods actually traveled interstate.72
Once the country settled into President Roosevelt’s New Deal and the
President articulated his plan to expand the Supreme Court, the Court
became much more amenable to Congressional exertions of power.73
Between 1937 and 1995, the congressional power under the Commerce
Clause went virtually unchecked. The Supreme Court upheld federal
authority over those activities that had a “substantial effect” on interstate
commerce, interpreted broadly, even if they were purely intrastate.74 In
addition, the Court upheld federal regulation of those areas that were
traditionally considered the province of the states, such as criminal law.
For example, in Perez v. United States, the Court upheld federal
prosecution of a loan shark on grounds that loan sharking was frequently
tied to organized crime, which in turn affected interstate commerce.75
All attempts to regulate intrastate activity based on a substantial effect on
interstate commerce were upheld between 1937 and 1995.76
The most expansive interpretation of the commerce power came in
1943 with Wickard v. Filburn,77 a case that is of particular importance to
any analysis of medical marijuana regulation. In Wickard, the Supreme
Court upheld the application of a federal law forbidding the production
of wheat in excess of a quota, despite the fact that the farmer’s wheat
was grown and milled on his property and was used solely for the
regulate wages and hours of local poultry producer); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 308–09 (1936) (finding that Congress had no power to regulate wages and hours of
coal miners because the relationship between company and employees was purely local
in nature).
72. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding the prohibition on
interstate sale of lottery tickets); Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308,
322 (1913) (upholding prohibition on interstate trafficking in women).
73. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 216 (1995).
74. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act, which regulated wages, hours, and working conditions in
all business over a certain size, effectively overruling Schechter Poultry); Darby, 312
U.S. at 100 (upholding regulation of wages and hours in the manufacture of goods
intended for shipment in interstate commerce, overruling Hammer); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding limits on the amount of wheat that a farmer could grow
for home consumption because the interstate price was a function of total wheat
production); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the
Civil Rights Act as applied to local hotel because discrimination would discourage
travel, affecting interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(upholding Civil Rights Act as applied to local restaurant on grounds that segregation in
public accommodations affected interstate travel, and many foodstuffs had traveled in
interstate commerce); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (upholding federal pollution laws because surface coal mining affects interstate
commerce).
75. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156–57 (1971).
76. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 74.
77. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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farmer’s personal consumption.78 The court reasoned that because Mr.
Filburn would no longer need to purchase wheat on the market, his
actions, in combination with others similarly situated, would substantially
affect interstate commerce.79 As later articulated in Maryland v. Wirtz,80
Wickard’s aggregation rule became known as the “enterprise concept,”
standing for the proposition that if a statute regulates an enterprise that is
substantially related to interstate commerce, the “de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”81 In
other words, Congress can lawfully regulate a large industry or enterprise by
exercising control over its smaller parts, whether those parts affect interstate
commerce or not.82 Congress reacted to cases like Wickard,83 Wirtz,84 and
Perez85 by dramatically expanding federal criminal legislation.86
In 1995, the Supreme Court made a striking shift in its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence when it invalidated the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 199087 in United States v. Lopez.88 The court rearticulated that
the test to be applied is whether the activity in question “‘substantially
affects’ interstate commerce,”89 and held that the law at issue was
invalid as it “neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce.”90 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, stated:
The broad language in [past] opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude . . . that there never will be a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.91

78. Id. at 127–28.
79. Id.
80. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). In Wirtz, the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate labor
relations involving a small group of employees because labor-related problems in one
group of employees could lead to problems with the entire enterprise, which would affect
interstate commerce. Id. at 192.
81. Id. at 196 n.27.
82. Id.
83. 317 U.S. 111.
84. 392 U.S. 183.
85. 402 U.S. 146.
86. Newbern, supra note 8, at 1602–05.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000). The Gun-Free School Zones Act made it a federal
offense for anyone to possess a firearm in a “school zone.” Id. § 922(q)(2)(A).
88. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
89. Id. at 559.
90. Id. at 551.
91. Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted). In context, the national/local distinction
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The impact of Lopez was immediate and dramatic. Within four years,
566 cases arguing Commerce Clause violations were filed in federal
courts, with over eighty filed in the first eight months.92
In the year 2000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its new, restrictive
position on the commerce power in United States v. Morrison.93 Despite
a presumption of constitutionality based on “[d]ue respect for the
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government,”94 the Court struck
down the Violence Against Women Act.95 Notably, the statute at issue
contained extensive congressional findings that violence against women
affected interstate commerce because it deterred victims from traveling
and doing business interstate.96 However, the Court considered this
Congressional finding insufficient, rejecting the argument “that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”97
In addition to reaffirming Lopez, the Morrison court articulated four
considerations that are relevant to a Commerce Clause analysis.98 First,
the Court considered whether the activity in question was economic in
nature.99 Second, the Court considered whether the statute in question
contained a “jurisdictional element” that may establish a connection with

merely highlights the basic question: whether the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. Id. at 567. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
warned that the commerce power “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government.” 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
92. Newbern, supra note 8, at 1607.
93. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
94. Id. at 607.
95. Id. at 627. The Violence Against Women Act provided a federal civil remedy
for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
96. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Justice Souter, writing for the four dissenters,
found that the findings were sufficient to support the exercise of Congressional power.
Id. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 617 (emphasis added). While this language seems to flatly contradict
Wickard and reject the aggregation rule, the Morrison court did not overrule that case.
Instead, the majority distinguished the activity in Wickard as “economic,” id. at 610,
while the activity in question in Morrison was “noneconomic.” Id. at 617.
98. Id. at 610–13.
99. Id. at 610. The court reasoned that “a fair reading of Lopez shows that the
noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision . . . .”
Id. The Court stated: “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.” Id. at 613. This economic/noneconomic distinction has
resulted in the criticism that it is unworkable. See Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s
Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 731, 737–43 (2003). As discussed below, this distinction provides no real guidance
to courts, as the way in which one defines the class of activities involved in a case
determines whether it is economic or noneconomic, commercial or noncommercial. See
infra Parts IV.B, V.
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interstate commerce.100 Third, the Court stated that the legislative
history was relevant to a Commerce Clause analysis, in order to aid the
court in evaluating the effect on interstate commerce, when it was not
readily apparent.101 However, “the existence of congressional findings is
not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.”102 Finally, the fourth factor articulated by the Court
was whether the link between the activity and the effect on interstate
commerce was “attenuated.”103 Whether an effect is “attenuated” is not
defined by a clear test or standard, and, therefore, this fourth factor has
become the most important in any Commerce Clause analysis.104
The willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to limit
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, as articulated in
Lopez and Morrison, has led the notoriously liberal Ninth Circuit to
issue several recent decisions that place similar limits on the reach of
Congress.105
B. Ninth Circuit Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Following Morrison
In three recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has applied the Lopez and
Morrison analysis to possession of child pornography,106 machine guns,107
and medical marijuana.108 In each of these cases, the activity in question
was not clearly economic or noneconomic in nature. Despite this ambiguity,
the court in each case defined the activity as noneconomic109 and,
therefore, found the connection to interstate commerce too attenuated to
justify the exercise of congressional power.110
In United States v. McCoy, the Ninth Circuit held that a federal statute
100. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611–12. The statute in question did not contain any
jurisdictional element. Id. at 613.
101. Id. at 612.
102. Id. at 614.
103. Id. at 612. In the case of the Violence Against Women Act, there were ample
congressional findings. However, the findings involved a causal chain that did not
support a finding of “substantial effects.” Id. at 615.
104. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
105. See infra Parts IV.B, V; see also supra note 15 (discussing the issue of
political ideology and federalism).
106. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
108. Raich II, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
109. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1131; Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1138; Raich II, 352 F.3d at
1228.
110. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1133; Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1138; Raich II, 352 F.3d at
1233.
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prohibiting the possession of child pornography was unconstitutional as
it applied to “simple intrastate possession of a visual depiction (or
depictions) that has not been mailed, shipped, or transported interstate
and is not intended for interstate distribution.”111 The court explicitly
limited its holding to that narrowly defined class of activities, avoiding
the enterprise concept by reasoning that the activity in question was not
merely “idiosyncratic facts of an individual instance of de minimis
character.”112
Applying the four-part Morrison test, the court found first that the
activity in question differed from the activity in Wickard, and, as such, it
was sufficiently noneconomic.113 The court also dismissed the attenuation
factor because it saw no relationship, “attenuated or otherwise, between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce.”114
The remaining two Morrison factors were more complicated. The
statute at issue in McCoy did contain an express “jurisdictional hook”
that was intended by Congress to satisfy Commerce Clause concerns.115
However, the court readily dismissed this because it “not only fails to
limit the reach of the statute to any category or categories of cases that
have a particular effect on interstate commerce, but . . . it encompasses
virtually every case imaginable . . . .”116 In other words, a jurisdictional
limitation is meaningless if it does not actually limit the application of
the statute to that which affects interstate commerce.
Finally, the McCoy court addressed the existence of legislative
findings relating to the affect on interstate commerce.117 In Morrison,
the availability of more extensive and more specific findings were not
sufficient for the Supreme Court to find the statute constitutional.
Likewise, the McCoy court did not hesitate to dismiss the legislative
111. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1133.
112. Id. at 1132. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
113. Whereas Filburn’s wheat was intended to replace an item in interstate
commerce, the photo at issue in McCoy was not intended for any kind of economic or
commercial uses. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1122. The court dismissed the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in a similar case, which held the same activity to be economic in nature
based on an “addiction theory” as “creative speculation.” Id. at 1121. In United States v.
Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 477 (3d Cir. 1999), the court reasoned that Congress could have
concluded that purely home-based possession of child pornography would lead to an
increased demand on the part of the possessor, thus causing the person to engage in
economic activity that would affect interstate commerce. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1121.
114. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124.
115. Id. The statute was limited to pornography in which the paper, film, or
cameras used had traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 1125.
116. Id. at 1124.
117. Id. at 1126–28. Unlike the statute at issue in Morrison, Congress had not made
findings specifically linking noncommercial intrastate activity to interstate commerce.
Instead, the findings present in the legislative history involved only general conclusions
regarding the pornography industry. Id. at 1127.
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findings as giving no support to the federal assertion of power over the
“simple intrastate possession” of a “home-grown” picture of a child.118
Relying on Lopez, Morrison, and McCoy, the Ninth Circuit decided
United States v. Stewart in November 2003.119 In Stewart, the court
overturned a conviction for possession of firearms because the connection
with interstate commerce was too attenuated.120 The only tangible
connection to interstate commerce was the travel of unusable parts of the
guns in question. Because “[a]t some level, of course, everything we
own is composed of something that once traveled in commerce,”121 the
court refused to find that the defendant had used the channels of
interstate commerce,122 and instead engaged in a Morrison analysis of
whether the activity “substantially affected” interstate commerce.123
Applying the Morrison test to the statute at issue in Stewart, Judge
Kozinski deemed the first and fourth factors124 “the most important”125
and found that the possession of a machine gun was not economic in
nature and that any effect on interstate commerce was attenuated.126 The
dissent would have categorized Stewart’s possession of his homemade
machine gun as part of a larger general class of activity (any possession
of machine guns), and would have held that this general class of activity
interfered with the interstate trafficking in machine guns, thereby clearly
affecting interstate commerce.127 However, the majority chose to narrowly
categorize Stewart’s possession of his homemade gun. Judge Kozinski
118. Id. at 1129.
119. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
120. Id. at 1137.
121. Id. at 1135.
122. Id. Lopez identified three categories of activities over which Congressional
Commerce power extends: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;
and (3) that which has a substantial relation to interstate commerce. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
123. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136.
124. The first Morrison factor is whether the regulation attempts to regulate activity
that is economic in nature. The fourth factor is the effect on interstate commerce.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–13 (2000).
125. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137 (citing United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114,
1119 (9th Cir. 2003)).
126. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137–38. The court also stated that the other two
Morrison factors led to the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
The statute contained no jurisdictional element, and “[n]othing in the legislative history
suggest[ed] that Congress ever considered the impact of purely intrastate possession of
homemade machine guns on interstate commerce . . . .” Id. at 1138–40.
127. Id. at 1143 (Restani, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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reasoned that possession of a gun by a person who would not otherwise
purchase such a gun, composed of legally available parts, assembled at
home, and not intended for sale, was not commercial in nature and did
not sufficiently affect interstate commerce.128 Therefore, by narrowly
classifying Stewart’s activity, the court found that the statute, as applied
to Stewart’s activity, was an impermissible extension of the commerce
power.129
Related to the issue of a narrow classification, the Stewart court also
addressed the issue of whether an “as applied” Commerce Clause challenge
was appropriate.130 By narrowly classifying the activity in question, a
court risks running afoul of the enterprise concept articulated in Wirtz.131
If a statute regulates a large enterprise that affects interstate commerce,
the “de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.”132 Potentially, this concept could limit “as
applied” challenges under the Commerce Clause, depending on how the
activity is defined. However, Judge Kozinski avoided the impact of this
rule by reasoning that the issue only arises when the individual instances
could affect a large enterprise that could interfere with interstate
commerce.133 Stewart’s possession, as narrowly defined by the majority,
was not part of a larger enterprise, and, therefore, the enterprise concept
did not affect the case.134
It is in light of these cases that a panel of the Ninth Circuit decided
Raich v. Ashcroft.
V. ANALYSIS OF RAICH
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the way a court defines the
activity in question in a case affects both the Morrison four-factor
analysis and the validity of the “as applied” challenge. In Raich, the Ninth
Circuit defines the activity in question as “the intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical
purposes on the advice of a physician.”135
128. Id. at 1138.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1140–41.
131. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
132. Id. This issue was not relevant to Lopez or Morrison, as both involved
challenges to each statute on its face. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000). However, McCoy was
an “as applied” challenge, and the dissent challenged the issue in that case. See United
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting).
133. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1141.
134. Id.
135. Raich II, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909
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While Judge Beam in dissent quarreled with the use of “noncommercial”
in the definition of the class of activities, he took no issue with the
majority defining possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes
as a separate class of activities.136 The majority proffered three grounds for
its conclusion.137 First, because of the involvement of a physician, the
concern regarding the user’s health is significantly different.138 Second,
marijuana prescribed by a physician does not contribute to the spread of
drug abuse.139 Finally, marijuana for medicinal use is distinct insofar as it
is not intended for distribution.140
It is a matter of simple logic to conclude that possession of marijuana
for medical use is a distinct class of activity from use and possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute it. In addition, as a matter of
common usage, medical marijuana is a distinct class of activities, as
demonstrated by the nine states that have passed statutes similar to the
Compassionate Use Act and the fact that the majority of American
adults support legalization of medical marijuana.141
Once it had defined the class of activity in question, the Raich court
applied the Morrison test to the CSA as it applied to the Plaintiffs.
A. The “Substantial Effects” Test
Applying the four Morrison factors142 to “the intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical
purposes on the advice of a physician,”143 the Ninth Circuit found that
the CSA, as applied to the plaintiffs, was likely unconstitutional, and
therefore the requested injunction should issue.144 In analyzing the first
Morrison factor—whether the statute regulates commerce or an
(2004).
136. Id. at 1239.
137. Id. at 1228.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Stein et al., supra note 9, at 57 (citing a Time/CNN poll showing that
eighty percent of adults favor legalization). The Compassionate Use Act specifically
provides that it does not override legislation relating to nonmedical use of marijuana, or use
that “endangers others.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
142. The court reiterated that the first and fourth factors are the most important.
Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1229 (citing United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.
2003)).
143. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1228.
144. Id. at 1235.

1893

EVERETT.DOC

8/21/2019 3:56 PM

economic enterprise—the court admitted that “[c]learly, the way in
which the activity or class of activities is defined is critical.”145 The
majority reasoned that the class of activities in question (medical use of
marijuana) was not in any way commercial.146
Defining the activity as the court did was essential to this
conclusion.147 By limiting its analysis to medicinal marijuana, the court
found that “[l]acking sale, exchange, or distribution, the activity does not
possess the essential elements of commerce.”148 Like the dissent in
Stewart, the dissent in Raich would have defined the class of activities
more generally, as part of an enterprise involving a product that is
fungible, “for which there is a well-established and variable interstate
market.”149 As such, the dissent would have found Wickard controlling.150
While wheat and marijuana seem, on the surface, to be interchangeable
for purposes of the Morrison analysis, the court correctly noted that the
difference lay in whether or not the activity was commercial or
economic.151 While activities related to the sale of marijuana were
clearly commercial, the majority considered the possession and use of
medical marijuana “a separate and distinct class of activities.”152
The court properly and easily dismissed the second Morrison factor:
the CSA contains no jurisdictional element that would limit its
application.153
The court rightly admitted that the third Morrison factor, the presence
of congressional findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity
on interstate commerce, weighed in favor of a finding of the CSA’s
constitutionality.154 In enacting the CSA, Congress did make specific
findings regarding the effect of the drug trade on interstate commerce,
which are embodied in the statute itself.155 However, as the Supreme
Court stated in Morrison, “the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.”156 The Raich court also noted that “there is no indication
that Congress was considering anything like the class of activities at
145. Id. at 1228.
146. Id. at 1229–30.
147. See id. at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully disagree with the court’s
insertion of the term ‘noncommercial’ into the class definition . . . .”).
148. Id. at 1229–30.
149. Id. at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1238 (Beam, J., dissenting) (arguing that the conduct at issue is “entirely
indistinguishable from that of Mr. Filburn’s”).
151. Id. at 1230.
152. Id. at 1228.
153. Id. at 1231.
154. Id. at 1232.
155. See infra Part II.B.
156. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
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issue here when it made its findings.”157 This is likely correct, due to the
fact that the federal government had a medical marijuana program in
place at the time the CSA was passed.158 While this factor did weigh in
favor of constitutionality, the court reiterated that it was not controlling,
and that the first and fourth factors were most significant.159
Finally, the Raich court examined the fourth Morrison factor—whether
the link between the activity and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is attenuated.160 While the court admitted that the cultivation
and possession of medical marijuana could, conceivably, affect interstate
commerce in some way, it was “far from clear that such an effect would
be substantial.”161 As Judge Kozinski stated in his concurring opinion to
Conant v. Walters, “[m]edical marijuana, when grown locally for
personal consumption, does not have any direct or obvious effect on
interstate commerce.”162 The Raich dissent argued that because marijuana
was a readily marketable economic commodity, this case was distinguishable
from both McCoy and Stewart, which both held that the link was too
attenuated.163 The dissent seemed to ignore the fact that both child
pornography and machine guns are, in fact, readily marketable economic
commodities.164 The mere fact that a commodity is readily marketable
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that, in certain classes of
activity involving that commodity, there is a link between that activity
and interstate commerce.
The majority’s definition of the class of activity in question in Raich
determined the outcome of the Morrison analysis. Likewise, it enabled the
majority to entertain the “as applied” challenge, despite the enterprise
concept.
B. The “As Applied” Commerce Clause Challenge
The enterprise concept, as discussed above, limits the court’s power to
overturn a statute in a particular case when the statute constitutionally
157. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1232.
158. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
159. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1232–33.
160. Id. at 1233.
161. Id.
162. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
163. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1242–43 (Beam, J., dissenting).
164. See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).
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regulates the class of activities involved.165 Thus, the major hurdle in
Raich was to distinguish the class of activities involved from those
involved in past cases in which the Ninth Circuit had upheld the CSA as
applied to marijuana possession.166 The court had held the CSA
constitutional in those cases. Therefore, if the majority were to define
the activity in Raich as part of that general class of activity (or larger
enterprise), the plaintiffs’ conduct would be “de minimis,” and the
enterprise concept would preclude a finding for the plaintiffs.
The cases in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the CSA are distinguishable
from Raich in that they all involved some level of distributive intent.167
Therefore, the court’s narrow definition of both the activities at issue in
Raich and the activities involved in past cases allowed the court to avoid
the enterprise concept.168 The past cases, according to the majority,
involved the CSA as applied to drug trafficking. In contrast, Raich and
Monson’s activity was “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation,
possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician . . . .”169 This activity represented a “substantial
portion” of the activity regulated by the federal CSA, and, after McCoy it
is, therefore, a separate and distinct class of activities.170
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In the
165. “‘[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is
of no consequence.’” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); see Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1228 (quoting United States v.
Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Supreme Court articulated the “class
of activities” language in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
166. The district court relied on these past cases to deny the plaintiff’s request for
an injunction. Raich I, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 925–26 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d, 352 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
167. See United States v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1972)
(involving intrastate distribution); Visman, 919 F.2d at 1392 (involving defendant who
admitted to plan to “split the proceeds” with his brother); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d
370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving intrastate drug trafficking); United States v. Kim,
94 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving guilty plea to the charge of possession
with intent to distribute).
168. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1228–29.
169. Id. at 1228.
170. Id. at 1229. The court reasoned that use and possession of marijuana for
medical purposes was a “substantial portion” of the activity regulated by the CSA
because at the time of the decision, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington had passed laws permitting it. Id.; see
discussion of McCoy, supra Part IV.B; see also County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F.
Supp. 2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying the Morrison test to a Commerce Clause
challenge of the CSA as applied to medicinal marijuana after McCoy).
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interim, the Ninth Circuit and other courts of appeals should continue to
apply the reasoning of Raich and narrowly define the classes of activities
involved in Commerce Clause challenges.
Adopting a narrow definition of the class of activities is appropriate
for two reasons. First, it is appropriate for the courts to limit the power
of the federal government under the Commerce Clause. Our country has
a dual system of government, in which the limitations on the reach of the
federal government protect individual freedoms. James Madison wrote:
“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people.”171 This security of rights requires that the federal government
remain limited, as the Framers intended.172 However, since the New
Deal, the federal government has continued to expand. It now exerts
power over most aspects of everyday life, including those areas
traditionally left to the people or regulated by the states, such as criminal
law.173 The states, where individual citizens have more power to control
the laws that govern them, are left with the Constitution, which, until
recently, has provided very little protection against the assertions of
federal authority.174 It is the role of the judiciary, perhaps even its duty,
to intervene. As Justice Kennedy stated, “the federal balance is too
essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in
securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the
other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.”175
Second, limiting federal commerce power by narrowly defining the
class of activities is within the discretion of the courts. The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison leave lower courts with a
significant amount of leeway, as the definition of the activity involved in
any given case necessarily determines the outcome. Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this flexibility, noting in Lopez
that the nature of an activity as “commercial” or “noncommercial” “may in

171. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
173. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (striking down
Congressional attempts to criminalize possession of handguns in school zones).
174. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Ninth Circuit commerce clause jurisprudence
following Morrison).
175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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some cases result in legal uncertainty.”176 However, while commentators
may criticize this uncertainty,177 the Court does not apologize for its
articulated test: “[S]o long as Congress’ [sic] authority is limited to those
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits,
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause will always
engender ‘legal uncertainty.’”178
VII. CONCLUSION
Citizens of nine states have taken the issue of providing relief to the
suffering very seriously, and have devised solutions to this problem.
Despite the clear will of the people in these states,179 the federal
government has insisted on enforcing the CSA against people suffering
from debilitating diseases, such as Diane Monson.180 The CSA exemplifies
a major problem in modern society, in which the federal government
disregards the limits placed upon it by the Constitution.
The Raich decision rightly ensured the effectiveness of the Compassionate
Use Act and other state laws that legalize medical marijuana. However,
the impact of Raich extends far beyond the issue of medical marijuana.
With Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court indicated its willingness
to enforce these constitutional limits on federal power. Congressional
powers are enumerated and limited, and Congress has continuously
exceeded the power granted to it in the Constitution. Courts must take a
firm stance against this abuse.
In Commerce Clause cases, no federal regulation should be upheld
unless the narrowly defined class of activities that it purports to regulate
substantially affects interstate commerce. Especially in the area of
criminal law, the courts must not “pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.”181 With McCoy, Stewart, and Raich, the Ninth Circuit has
176. Id. at 566.
177. See Choper, supra note 99, at 735.
178. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
179. A recent poll shows that support for medical marijuana among California
voters has become stronger since the Compassionate Use Act was passed. While only
39% of voters think that marijuana should be totally legalized, 74% support the right of
severely ill people to use the drug for medical purposes. Of those polled, 63% of selfidentified Republicans, 53% of conservatives, 78% of moderates, and 92% of liberals
support the law. Of those voters over sixty-five years of age, 59% support it. Bob
Egelko, Medical Pot Law Gains Acceptance: Prop. 215 Polls Better Now Than When It
Passed, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2004, at A1.
180. See supra note 9 (citing medical marijuana cases).
181. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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properly and necessarily limited Congress’s reach, ensuring that the
fundamental principles of federalism are alive and well. The Supreme
Court should affirm this decision.
SAMANTHA EVERETT
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